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Both to address unmet medical needs and to improve industry competitiveness, regulators in 
both the United States and the European Union have taken bold steps to translate academic 
research from the university lab to the patient. A pharmaceutical public-private partnership 
(PPPP), which is a legally binding contract between a private pharmaceutical enterprise and a 
public research university (or a private university doing research funded with public funds), 
can be a significant tool to ensure a more efficient payoff in the highly regulated world of 
pharmaceuticals. In particular, a properly framed binding contract, coupled with respect for  
positive social norms, can move the parties away from an inefficient prisoners’ dilemma 
Nash Equilibrium to the Pareto Optimal Frontier. When coupled with appropriate attention to 
the difficult task of coordinating the actions of interdependent actors, a PPPP arrangement 
can enhance the likelihood of successful commercialization by flipping the parties’ incentives 
as compared with more traditional contracts. Because PPPPs are less common in Europe than 
in the United States, a key purpose of this article is to provide an annotated roadmap that 
universities, private firms, and EU policy makers can use to create efficient PPPPs to enhance 
for-profit innovation in the pharmaceutical industry in Europe. A secondary purpose is to 
suggest amendments to the U.S. laws governing the patenting of government-funded 
technology to prevent undue burdens on the sharing of certain upstream medical discoveries 
and research tools. Our analysis is not only comparative; it also combines, we believe for the 
first time, a game theory and law and management approach to for-profit PPPPs. 
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“[P]atent protection strikes a delicate balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to 
creation, invention, and discovery’ and ‘imped[ing] the flow of information that might 




Both to address unmet medical needs and to improve industry competitiveness, regulators in 
both the European Union (“EU”) and the United States have taken bold steps “to foster 
translation from the university laboratory to the healthcare sector through the generation and 
support of start-ups, spin-offs, university-industry consortia, and other platforms,”2 that is, to 
promote the movement of discoveries from “bench to bedside.”3 For example, the EU 
Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI), discussed in Part V below, is a public-private 
partnership initiative that invites competitors to bid for government funds. The IMI is an open 
innovation program designed to improve the drug development process with a €2 billion 
budget provided by participating governments and industry participants.  
In the United States, the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) established the 
National Center for Advanced Translational Sciences (NCATS) in 2011, with a fiscal year 
2012 budget of US $575 million.4 Its Strategic Alliances Office “aims to make it easy for 
industry and academia to interact and partner with NCATS laboratories and scientists,” by, 
among other things, “negotiating standard forms and model agreements between NCATS and 
outside parties, including universities, pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology 
companies.”5 According to the European Federation for Pharmaceutical Sciences (EUFEPS),  
“the only pan-European body to represent the interests of scientists in industry, academia, 
government and other institutions engaged in drug research, development, regulation and 
policymaking through Europe,”6 Europe will need to pursue similar initiatives to retain a 
competitive advantage in pharmaceutical innovation and “to support the progress of the 
present implementation of the IMI research agenda.”7 
Experts predict that NCATS could help address the “valley of death” – “the large 
research and funding gap that sets federally funded basic researchers (those . . . in nonprofit 
research institutions, academia, hospitals, and federal laboratories) on one side and the 
pharmaceutical industry on the other.” 8 As John C. Reed, professor and Donald Bren chief 
executive chair at the Sanford-Burnham Medical Research Institute in La Jolla, California, 
explained: 
 
[P]rivate companies and venture capitalists are increasingly reluctant to fund 
                                                            
1 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013), quoting Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).  
2 Rogerio Gaspar et al., Toward a European Strategy for Medicines Research (2014-2020): The EUFEPS Position Paper on 
Horizon 2010, 47 EUR. J. PHARMACEUTICAL SCIENCES 979, 980 (2012). 
3 Id. 
4 National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences, http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/cts/cts.html.  
5 Id. 
6 European Federation for Pharmaceutical Sciences, http://www.eufeps.org/. 
7 Gaspar et al., supra note 2, at 982. 
8 John C. Reed, NCATS Could Mitigate Pharma Valley of Death, GENETIC ENG’G & BIOTECH. NEWS (May 15, 2011), 
http:www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/ncats-could-mitigate-pharma-valley-of-death/3662/. See also Arti K. Rai, Jerome H. 
Reichman, Paul F. Uhlir & Colin Crossman, Pathways across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for 
Accelerating Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 4 (2008) (proposing a two-tier regime for promoting 
“intensive, large-scale collaboration between academics, who possess unique skills in designing assays that can identify 
promising targets, and pharmaceutical firms that hold libraries of potentially useful small molecules as trade secrets, making 
them largely off limits to these same academic scientists.”) 
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the crucial early stages of preclinical development—the research necessary to 
“translate” promising discoveries made in laboratories into optimized 
candidate therapeutics ready for testing in clinical trials. 
 
This gap includes many steps in the drug discovery and development process, 
including assay development, high-throughput screening, medicinal 
chemistry, exploratory pharmacology, and rigorous preclinical testing of drug 
efficacy and safety in animal models of disease.9 
 
This article focuses on pharmaceutical public-private partnerships (PPPPs)10  
involving a public university or research institute (or a private university or institute doing 
medical research funded by the government) and a private firm in the pharmaceutical 
industry to develop new drugs that can be sold by the pharmaceutical firm at a profit. 11 For 
example, Bristol-Myers Squibb formed a public-private partnership with ten cancer research 
institutes – the International Immuno-Oncology Network – to “facilitate the translation of 
scientific research findings into clinical trials and, eventually, clinical practice, as well as 
advance innovation in drug discovery and development.”12 Such arrangements are common 
in the United States but have not yet taken hold in the EU.  
In contrast to the PPPPs discussed in this article, there are a variety of international 
public-private partnerships involving the World Health Organization, including Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria, the Stop TB Partnership and the Roll Back Malaria Partnership, that are designed to 
provide affordable medicines for so-called “diseases of poverty” in developing countries.13 
For example, Pfizer, Merck Serona, and Chemtura have joined the World Health 
Organization’s Tropical Disease Network and allow its TD Compound Evaluation Network 
“to submit targets for in-house screening against a subset of the firms’ respective chemical 
libraries.”14 Partnerships of this sort, which are “highly integrated relationships among states, 
international organizations, companies, NGOs, research institutes, and/or philanthropic 
                                                            
9 Reed, supra note 8. One of the NIH programs transferred to NCATS is the Molecular Libraries Probe Production Centers 
Network (MLPCN), “the first federally funded network to facilitate drug discovery by producing early-stage small molecule 
leads.” Id. As Dr. Reed explained: “These centers, most of which reside in universities and nonprofit research institutes 
across the U.S., provide federally funded researchers and even small biotechnology companies with access to drug discovery 
capabilities previously found only within large pharmaceutical companies. Those capabilities include large chemical 
libraries, assay development, ultra high-throughput robotic screening, cheminformatics, medicinal chemistry, project 
management, and several other drug discovery-related services that typically don’t exist in academic labs and departments.” 
Id. The NIH’s Molecular Libraries Small Molecule Repository contains more than 100,000 small molecules generated by the 
academic researchers. Molecular Libraries Initiative, General Information, http://mli.nih.gov/mlsmr/general-information. 
These molecules are put into the public domain so are available for researchers doing “high-throughput screening (HTS) of 
small molecule libraries against assays containing target proteins to identify promising compounds that may lead to 
patentable drugs.” Rai et al., supra note 8, at 7. Unlike biologics, comprising macromolecules expensive to produce, small 
molecule drugs can be mass produced at a low cost. Id. at 3. 
10 As Julia Paschal Davis notes, notwithstanding the word “partnership,” public-private partnerships “are defined and bound 
by contracts; they are no more or less than the documents negotiated, approved, and executed.”  44 PROCUREMENT LAW. 9, 9 
(Fall 2008). 
11 Unlike Gian Luca Burci, who defines a pharmaceutical public-private partnerships as a “long-term collaborative 
arrangement among a group of diverse stakeholders, some of which of a public nature (e.g. government agencies and 
intergovernmental organizations) and others of a private nature (e.g. non-governmental organizations, private commercial 
companies, research institutes, professional associations etc.) to jointly pursue a discreet public health goal,” Gian Luca 
Burci, Public/Private Partnerships in the Public Health Sector, 6  INT’L ORG’S L. REV. 359, 361 (2009), we include in the 
public side public universities and research institutes and private universities and research institutes that receive government 
funding for medical research.  
12 Public-Private Partnerships Step Up, APPLIED CLINICAL SCIENCES ONLINE (June 4, 2012). 
13 Dan Phair, Orphan Drug Programs, Public-Private Partnerships and Current Efforts to Develop Treatments for Diseases 
of Poverty, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 193, 193 (2008). 
14 Rai et al., supra note 8, at 30. 
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foundations,”15 are designed to address the market’s failure incentivize private firms to 
develop and market drugs that are not profitable absent government or NGO funding.16 
Although certain aspects of our analysis are applicable to such arrangements, there are 
significant differences so, except as otherwise noted, we use the term “pharmaceutical public-
private partnerships (PPPPs)” to refer to for-profit arrangements.  
We believe that properly structured PPPPs, coupled with an appropriate intellectual 
property regime, can be effective tools for meeting the objectives articulated by Maire 
Geoghegan-Quinn, EU Commissioner of Research, Innovation and Science, in “Horizon 
2020—the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation,”17 namely, “(i) excellent 
science, (ii) industrial leadership and (iii) societal challenges.”18 The primary purpose of this 
article is to promote their broader use in the EU by providing an annotated roadmap for 
universities, private pharmaceutical firms, and policymakers in the EU. A secondary purpose 
is to suggest amendments to the U.S. laws governing the patenting of government-funded 
technology to prevent undue burdens on the sharing of certain upstream medical discoveries 
and research tools. Our analysis is not only comparative; it also combines, we believe for the 
first time, a game theory and law and management19 approach to for-profit PPPPs. 
In Part I, we describe the pharmaceutical market then, in Part II, we explain how a 
partnership arrangement between a public university20 and a private firm can promote drug 
innovation and discuss key aspects of such an arrangement. In Part III, we use game theory to 
explain why efficient PPPPs need to be supported by a binding contract, the free exchange of 
information, and positive aligned incentives. Part IV provides lessons from public-private 
partnerships in the construction industry and applies them to pharmaceutical public-private 
partnerships. We discuss the European  Innovation in Medicines Initiative and other 
European developments in Part V. In Part VI, we address the intellectual property issues 
inherent in drug development collaboration between academia and private industry and 
propose modifications to the Bayh-Dole Act,21 which is the U.S. statute governing the 
patenting and licensing of university technology funded by the federal government. We also 
discuss the challenge of harmonizing the rules on technology transfer in the EU and suggest 
solutions. We conclude in Part VII by summarizing our roadmap for PPPPs in the EU, which 
could also be adopted in whole or in part in the United States. 
 
I. The Pharmaceutical Market 
 
In 2011, worldwide expenditures on pharmaceuticals approached $1 trillion.22 That year, 
                                                            
15 Lisa Clarke, Responsibility of International Organizations under International Law for the Acts of Global Health Public-
Private Partnerships, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 55, 59 (2011). 
16 Nathaniel Lipkus, How to Understand Product Development: Public-Private Partnerships as Vehicles for Innovation in 
Combating Neglected Disease, 10 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 385, 390-96 (2006). 
17 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/435. Horizon 2020, which runs from 2014-2020, is 
the financial instrument for implementing the “Innovation Union.” Funded with a budget of €80 billion, it is designed to 
secure the EU’s global competitiveness by consolidating all research and innovation funding currently provided through the 
Framework Programmes for Research and Technical Development, the innovation-related activities of the Competitiveness 
and Innovation Framework Programme, and the European Institute of Innovation and Technology. 
18 Gaspar et al., supra note 2, at 980. 
19 Constance E. Bagley, “Forward” in  LEGAL STRATEGIES: HOW CORPORATIONS USE LAW TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE v 
(Antoine Masson & Mary J. Shariff eds., 2010) (describing emerging field of law and management, which includes the 
ability of firms to use law for competitive advantage). 
20 We use “public university” to include private universities, research institutes, and similar academic institutions conducting 
medical research funded, at least in part, by the government. 
21 Bayh-Dole Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-
212). 




France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom alone spent $159 billion on 
medicines.23 The United States spent $325 million.24 The pharmaceutical industry is one of 
the largest single industries in the both the EU and the United States,25 and it is highly 
concentrated.26 As seen in Table 1,27  the ten largest firms earned roughly $467 billion in 
2012. 
 
Table 1 Top Ten Pharmaceutical Firms in 2012 
Name Headquarters 
2012 Revenues 
(US $ billions)  
1. Johnson & Johnson U.S. $67.20 
2. Pfizer U.S. $58.99 
3. Novartis EU $56.67 
4. Roche EU $47.80 
5. Merck U.S. $47.27 
6. Sanofi EU $46.41 
7. GlaxoSmithKline EU $39.93 
8. Abbott Laboratories/AbbVie U.S. $39.87 
9. AstraZeneca EU $27.97 
10. Bayer HealthCare EU $24.30 
 
The health care sector accounted for approximately 9 percent of EU GDP in 201028 
and nearly double that in the United States.29 Because the total expenditure on health care is 
rising faster than economic growth in both the EU and the U.S., the ratio of health care 
spending to GDP is increasing. A substantial portion of the growth in health care expenses is 
attributable to pharmaceuticals. 
The development of new pharmaceuticals is both high risk30 and high cost, with new 
drugs costing a billion dollars or more to bring to market.31 Innovation losses in the 
pharmaceutical industry’s development of new drugs are increasing.32 Although the number 
of approved new molecular entities has remained steady in the past ten years, the cost side 




25 Gaspar et al., supra note 2. 
26 In the period from 2003 to 2007, roughly 80 percent of all pharmaceutical patents granted pursuant to the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty were issued to firms domiciled in just thirteen developed countries. Anand Grover, Brian Citro, Mihir 
Mankad & Fiona Lander, Pharmaceutical Companies and Global Lack of Access to Medicines: Strengthening 
Accountability under the Right to Health, 40 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 234, 238 (2012). 
27 Sales data from FiercePharma, Top Pharma Companies by 2012 Revenues, http://www.fiercepharma.com/special-
reports/top-pharma-companies-2012-revenues#ixzz2ZAg0zpeW. 
28 For data see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/overview_en.html. According to the European 
Commission the 9 percent covers the pharmaceutical sector (prescription and non-prescription medicines), medical devices, 
and health services. 
29  Natalie Jones, Health Care in America: Follow the Money, NPR (Mar. 19, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/03/19/148932689/health-care-in-america-follow-the-money. 
30 Valerie Gutmann Koch, Incentivizing the Utilization of Pharmacogenetics in Drug Development, HEALTH CARE L. & 
POL’Y 263, 274, 274 n. 89, 275 (2012) (citing data showing that only 1 out of 60,000 compounds created by drug companies 
are highly successful, roughly 1 out of 6 drugs put into clinical trials are ultimately approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”), and more than 3 percent of drugs approved by the FDA are subsequently withdrawn due to 
negative side effects). 
31 Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., 2011 Profile 10 (2011). As Valerie Koch notes, others dispute this calculation. Koch, 
supra note 30, at 274 n. 87, citing Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing the High Cost of 
Pharmaceutical Research, 6 BIOSCIENCES 34, 36, 38-39 (2011). 
32ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA, LUIGI ORSENIGO & FABIO PAMMOLLI, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS IN PHARMACEUTICALS: A 
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 2-3 (2000). 
33 Edward F.X. Hughes, Michael Hu, Karl Schultz, Jack Sheu & Daniel Tschopp, The Innovation Gap in Pharmaceutical 
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pharmaceutical industry in both the U.S. and the EU are looking for new ways to 
institutionalize and sustain pharmaceutical innovation and to sell new products.34 This 
productivity challenge can be explained in part by an increase in research and development 
(R&D) costs,35 reduced output, and depleted pipelines.36 At the same time,  pharmaceutical 
enterprises suffer from inefficient internal processes to perform basic science and to assess 
the value of “proof of concept” inventions, especially when they involve distant knowledge 
domains.37  In addition, the shareholders of the major pharmaceutical firms have grown 
accustomed to dramatic returns from “blockbusters,”38 which are costly to develop. “Even as 
it might fight it, industry is anticipating change, admitting that ‘[t]he era of the blockbuster is 
ending.’”39 
The national market for medicines is highly regulated with competition and corporate 
behavior being shaped by national health systems, national regulatory requirements for price 
and product information, legal rules governing human trials and authorization procedures, 
and rules governing property rights.40 In the EU, the European Medicines Agency coordinates 
regulatory oversight of the pharmaceutical industry in the Member States.41 It also acts as a 
liaison between the EU, the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (“ICH”), and the 
World Health Organization (“WHO”).42 In the United States, the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) regulates the testing, approval, and marketing of pharmaceuticals as 
well as medical devices. Other developed countries have similar regulators.43 Thus, 
competitiveness in the pharmaceutical industry is negatively affected by market 
fragmentation and different research systems. 
Patents make it possible for the pharmaceutical industry to extract rents by preventing 
the production and sale of cheap generics.44 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (the “TRIPS Agreement”)45 requires World Trade Organization 
members to grant and honor patents on pharmaceuticals. Although the Doha Agreement46 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Drug Discovery & New Models For R&D Success, Kellogg School of Management (Mar. 12, 2007), available at 
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/biotech/faculty/articles/NewRDModel.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2013). 
34  GAMBARDELLA, ORSENIGO & PAMMOLLI, supra note 32, at 7 (2000). 
35 U.S. Government Accountability Office, New Drug Development: Science, Business, Regulatory, and Intellectual 
Property Issues Cited as Hampering Drug Development Efforts 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0749.pdf  (noting that industry R&D costs increased 147 percent between 1993 and 2004 
but that FDA submissions for new chemical molecules have generally decreased since 1995). 
36 Robert F. Service, Surviving the Blockbuster Syndrome, 203 SCI. 1796 (2004). 
37 Reddi Kotha, Gerard George & Kannan Srikanth, Bridging the Mutual Knowledge Gap: Coordination and the 
Commercialization of University Science, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 498 (2013). 
38 C.J. Tralau-Stewart, C.A. Wyatt, D.E. Kleyn & A. Ayad, Drug Discovery: New Models for Industry–Academic 
Partnerships, 14(1-2) DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 95 (2009). A drug is considered a blockbuster if it has annual global sales of 
more than $1 billion. Koch, supra note 30, at 274. 
39 Koch, supra note 30, at 273. 
40 There has been limited harmonization since 1990 involving the United States, the EU, and Japan pursuant to the 
International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human 
Use. ICH Global Cooperation Group, ICH Information Brochure (May 2001), available at 
http://www.ich.org/LOB/media/MEDIA410.pdf. 
41 Council Regulation 2309/93, 1993 O.J. EEC (L214). 
42 Overview of European Medicines Agency, at http://www.emea.europa.eu/htms/aboutus/emeaoverview.htm (last visited 
July 8, 2013). 
43 Katherine A. Davis, Comment, An International Drug Administration: Curing Uncertainty in International 
Pharmaceutical Liability, 18 NW. J.  INT’L L. & BUS. 685, 718 (1998). 
44 Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a 
Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 95 (2007). 
45 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. (1994). 
46 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC2 (Nov. 14, 2001). All countries, other than the Least-Developed Countries (“LDCs”) were required to 
stop reverse-engineering patented drugs to produce cheap generics by 2005. This restriction applies to even LDCs as of 
2013. Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 29 November 2005, Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 for 
Least-Developed Country Members, WT/IP/C/40 (Nov. 30, 2005). As Aaron Fellmeth points out, the adequate supply and 
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permits countries “to issue compulsory licenses to meet the health needs of nations unable to 
produce locally needed medicines,”47 developing countries continue to have difficulties 
obtaining essential medicines at affordable prices.48 
 Pharmaceutical patents spur investment, but they also reduce competition, leading to 
higher prices.49 They can also impede further innovation. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated 
in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., “[P]atent protection strikes 
a delicate balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and 
discovery’ and ‘imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, 
invention.’”50  
Since the successful mapping of the human genome in 2002,51 there has been 
increased focus on both tailoring existing drugs to targeted populations “(‘many drugs across 
one genome’)” and on developing new drugs tailored to particular genomes to improve 
efficacy and reduce side effects “(‘many drugs across one genome’).”52 Company scientists at 
GlaxoSmithKline have published a number of scientific papers in top medical journals 
promoting pharmacogenetics,53 and a number of small biotech firms have entered into 
agreements with large pharmaceutical firms to develop pharmacogenetic test kits and 
innovations.54 They include a $25 million deal between GlaxoSmithKline and Incyte 
Genomics to create diaDEXUS and a $42.5 million agreement between Abbott Laboratories 
and Genset to develop tests for gauging drug response (both entered into in 1997) and a $200 
million agreement between Roche and deCODE “‘to identify disease genes through genetic 
analysis of the uniquely homogenous Icelandic population.’”55 
As a result of this competitive and regulatory environment, the pharmaceutical 
industry has tried multiple strategies to increase new product development and the return on 
investment.  Examples include increasing R&D efforts, horizontal consolidation, biotech in-
licensing and acquisitions,56 and outsourcing to “drug discovery” firms.57 In this article, we 
focus on for-profit PPPP arrangements between government-funded academic institutions 




distribution of drugs for the developing countries is also impeded by contracts that guarantee the developed country’s 
pharmaceutical firm exclusive rights to the clinical test data necessary to secure marketing approval of new drugs. Aaron 
Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing 
Approval Data under the TRIPS Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 445 (2004). Although important, this topic is beyond 
the scope of this article. 
47 Reichman & Cooper Dreyfuss, supra note 44, at 97. 
48 Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 
AM. J. INT’L L. 317 (2005). 
49 For example, Myriad Genetics was able to charge $3,000 for a test for the two breast cancer genes BRCA-1 and BRCA-2 
because it had patents on those gene sequences while a university lab can sequence 20,000 genes for less than $500.  
Although the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Myriad’s patent on isolated gene sequences because they are naturally 
occurring substances, it upheld the patent on cDNA, the synthetic complementary DNA used to develop tests for specific 
genetic markers. Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).  
50 Id. at 2116, quoting Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).  
51 Robert I. Field, How the Government Created and Sustains the Private Pharmaceutical Industry, 6 ST. LOUIS J. HEALTH L. 
& POL’Y  29 (2012). The U.S. Government spent $3.8 billion mapping the complete set of human genes. Id. at 30. To 
encourage private scientists to participate, the government put its findings in a public database within twenty-four hours of 
discovery, with no limitations on their use. Id. at 29. 
52 Koch, supra note 30, at 265-68. 
53 Id. at 273-74. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 279-80. 
56 Arlene Weintraub, Potential for Deals Drives a Big Surge in the Biotech Sector,  N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2013) (for example, 
in June 2013, Johnson & Johnson bought Aragon Pharmaceuticals, a biotech firm with a prostate cancer treatment in 
midstage human trials, for $650 million cash plus the potential for an additional $350 million if certain research milestones 
are met). 
57 Hughes et al., supra note 33.  
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II. Key Aspects of the PPPP Arrangement 
 
A. The Need for Collaboration 
 
The pharmaceutical industry is a science industry for which innovation is the fundamental 
source of competitiveness.58 If pharmaceutical enterprises try to operate all aspects of their 
businesses in-house, demands on investment and the corresponding risk increase. If, instead, 
pharmaceutical enterprises cooperate and partner with external inventors and funding sources 
(including the government), the risk and need for investment decreases and the cost can be 
shared with the partner.59 When members of the pharmaceutical industry are looking for new 
ways to institutionalize and sustain pharmaceutical innovation and to sell new products, they 
now often look for university partners.60  
For example, Pfizer Inc. has created multiple Centers for Therapeutic Innovation 
(CTI) in the United States. As of April 2013, Pfizer had partnered with twenty-one academic 
medical research centers in the United States61 after receiving more than 300 applications 
from researchers.62 The objective of this initiative is to conduct joint research aimed at 
finding new “biotherapeutic modalities” “across all therapeutic areas” to “transform research 
and development through a focus on translational medicine.”63 The Centers for Therapeutic 
Innovation manage the PPPPs on a project-by-project basis. The incentives, operating models 
and goals for both the academic and Pfizer researchers are designed to achieve a positive 
Proof-of-Mechanism study in humans.64   
Although several studies have shown that public sector research can and already does 
play an important role in the discovery of new drugs, the interaction and collaboration 
between the public and private sectors is both limited and complex.65 In particular, public 
sector universities have often not been credited as a significant partner. Traditionally, the 
pharmaceutical entities have co-financed research projects by academic researchers and, in 
the end, taken ownership of all the resulting intellectual property. In some cases, the private 
firms have paid royalties to the academic institutions or individual researchers on successful 
products.  
Forming partnerships of any sort increases coordination costs, however, including 
transaction costs.66 A study of sixty-two American universities concluded that most 
                                                            
58 Giulio Bottazzi, Giovanni Dosi, Marco Lippi, Fabio Pammolli, & Massimo Riccaboni, Innovation Aids Corporate Growth 
in the Evolution of The Drug Industry, 19 INT’L J. INDUSTRIAL ORG. 1161 (2001). 
59
 YVES L. DOZ & GARY HAMEL, ALLIANCE ADVANTAGE: THE ART OF CREATING VALUE THROUGH PARTNERING (1998). 
60 GAMBARDELLA, ORSENIGO & PAMMOLLI, supra note 32, at 7. See also Walter W. Powell, Kenneth W. Koput & Laurel 
Smith-Doerr, Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 116, 118 (1996) (“In addition to research universities and both start-up and established firms, government 
agencies, nonprofit research institutes, and leading hospitals have played key roles in conducting and funding 
[biotechnology] research, while venture capitalists and law firms have played essential parts as talent scouts, advisors, 
consultants, and financiers.”). In biotechnology and other fields “where knowledge is advancing rapidly and the sources of 
knowledge are widely dispersed, organizations enter into an array of alliances to gain access to different  
competencies and knowledge.” Id. 
61 Pfizer, Press Release, CHOP Collaborates with Pfizer’s Centers for Therapeutic Innovation to Speed Pediatric Research & 
Development, Apr. 3, 2013, available at www.press.pfizer.com/press-release/chop-collaborates-pfizers-centers-therapeutic-
innovation-speed-pediatric-research-deve. 
62 Pfizer, Centers for Therapeutic Innovation, www.pfizer.com/research/rd_works/centers_for_therapeutic_innovation.jsp. 
63 Pfizer, supra note 61. 
64 Pfizer, Centers for Therapeutic Innovation, Translating Leading Science into the Clinic, available at 
www.pfizer.com/files/research/partnering/. 
65 Ian Cockburn & Rebecca Henderson, Public–Private Interaction in Pharmaceutical Research, 93 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L 
ACAD. SCIENCES (USA), 12725–12730 (Nov. 1996). See also Michael D. Rawlins, Cutting the Cost of Drug Development?, 
3 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 360 (2004); Thomas P. Stossel, Regulating Academic–Industrial Research 
Relationships —Solving Problems or Stifling Progress?, 353(10)  NEW ENG. J.  MED. 1060 (2005).  
66 For a further discussion of coordination costs, ex ante and ex post, see Kendall W. Artz & Thomas H. Brush, Asset 
Specificity, Uncertainty and Relational Norms: An Examination of Coordination Costs in Collaborative Strategic Alliances, 
41 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 337 (2000). See also Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among 
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university inventions “are so embryonic that further development with the active involvement 
by the inventor is required for any chance of commercialization.”67  As a result, “In the 
pharmaceutical industry, firm connectedness to the academic community, such as through 
collaboration and coauthoring scientific articles, is a key determinant of successful drug 
discovery.”68 If the coordination challenges can be properly managed, strategic alliances can 
improve the competitive advantage of pharmaceutical enterprises in the market and enhance 
public welfare by yielding new drugs. 
 
B. Objectives of the PPPP Relationship 
 
The objectives of the PPPP arrangement are to complete some or all of the steps from basic 
science to drug commercialization optimally for all parties (from a game theory perspective, 
to create joint utility) by creating a fully collaborative team with a high level of cooperation, 
trust, information sharing,69 including open access to the books and records for all 
participants, and positive joint incentives.70 The PPPP contract should incorporate all of these 
attributes regardless of whether the cooperation deals with the identification and validation of 
new targets, access to new technologies, pharmacogenomics, pre-clinical pharmacology, 
structural analysis of biomolecules, diagnostic tools and microarray development, 
bioinformatics, or identification and validation of biomarkers.  
To deliver an efficient framework for collaboration, the PPPP contract must include 
mechanisms for encouraging cooperative behavior, leading to a win-win approach rather than 
a traditional competitive perspective.71  Thus, the PPPP contract should encourage the parties 
to collaborate with a strong focus on attaining common goals, by sharing gains or losses and 
information, and by instituting risk and reward systems to build and share innovation. It 
should also promote continuous long-term improvement.  Therefore, we argue, a PPPP 
agreement should both be reduced to writing and be coupled with respect for relational 
norms, thereby ensuring the most efficient transaction. If the PPPP contract and the relational 
forms of governance address the key factors optimally, they can change the payoffs in the 
game and thereby enhance the joint values.  In particular, as discussed in Part III, the PPPP 
arrangement will move the parties away from an inefficient prisoners’ dilemma Nash 
equilibrium to a Pareto Optimal Frontier. This is in contrast to a traditional arm’s length 
contract, which often consists of each party self-optimizing rewards and minimizing its own 
risks while allocating the cost of future breaches. 
If the contract objectives are joint utility, efficiency, and innovation and 
commercialization optimization, the fulfillment obligations must balance and meet the needs 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 686 (1986) (“[L]aw and economics scholars need to pay more heed to 
how transaction costs influence the resolution of disputes. Because it is costly to carry out legal research and to engage in 
legal proceedings, a rational actor often has good reason to apply informal norms, not law, to evaluate the propriety of 
human behavior.”). 
67 Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. 
REV. 240 (2001). 
68 Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension:  Patents, Relationships, and Organizational Integration in Technology 
Transfer, 100 CAL. L.  REV. 1503, 1534 (2012). 
69 See Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private 
Partnerships, 113 ECON. J., Conference Papers C69-C76 (Mar. 2003).  
70 Henrik Andersen, Fuguo Cao, Christina D. Tvarno & Ping Wang, PPP - An International Analysis from a Legal and 
Economic Perspective (pdf), available at www.cbs.dk;  Matton Van den Berg & Peter Kamminga, Optimising Contracting 
for Alliances in Infrastructure Projects, 23(1) INT’L CONSTRUCTION L. REV. 59, 59 (2006).    
71 Scott E. Masten, Transaction Costs, Mistakes, and Performance: Assessing the Importance of Governance, 14 
MANAGERIAL & DEC. ECON. 119-129 (1993); IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Kendall W. Artz & Thomas H. Brush, Asset Specificity, Uncertainty and Relational 
Norms: An Examination of Coordination Costs in Collaborative Strategic Alliances, 41 J. ECON. BEH. & ORG. 337 (2000); 
Paul A. Rubin & Joseph R. Carter, Joint Optimality in Buyer-Supplier Negotiations, 3 J. PURCHASING & MATERIALS MGMT. 
20 (1990). 
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and interests of the academic researchers, the research universities, industry, and the 
government or other public provider of research funding. The academics must fulfill their 
own and their university’s desire to create and disseminate knowledge, which requires 
optimization of publishing data and results in international journals. Such publications both 
disseminate knowledge and enhance the career opportunities for the researchers. Although 
some academic researchers may be willing to defer publication until a patent application is 
filed, significant publication delays are problematic.72 The industry players need the 
resources in the public sector to fill the innovation gap and change the model of drug 
development so they can develop and commercialize innovative drugs and earn an attractive 
return on investment in R&D for their shareholders.73  From a societal perspective, joint 
utility is achieved when consumers gain access to a new drug more rapidly and cheaply than 
would be the case if there were no public-private collaboration. 
Contract negotiation, collaboration management, funding, timelines, the production of 
deliverables, confidentiality, the sharing of intellectual property, and understanding the 
differences among the parties are all crucial contractual elements that must be considered to 
make the PPPP work effectively.  Behind the PPPP arrangement, there will usually be an 
industry-specific, agreed-upon document.  A committee-type collaborative body, which 
includes representatives from all of the parties, is usually necessary to establish the terms of 
the contract.  If there is a cooperative body involved, it is crucial that the parties hand over 
the contract negotiation to the cooperative body and that such body follows the PPPP 
framework contract during the contract period.74   
Even when there is no cooperative body, it is important for all the negotiators to keep 
in mind the importance of ensuring the free flow of information and the alignment of 
incentives. Drafters and negotiators should focus especially on common goals and joint 
utility, rather than on traditional views of control and claims of exclusive property rights.  
It is critical to conduct specialized training for both the researchers and the 
administrative and managerial staff, which may include training in translational or 
pharmaceutical medicine covering target and drug discovery, preclinical development, 
clinical trials, and management.75 This helps ensure the proper functioning of an alternative 
project organization with a project-oriented collaborative culture that enables physical 
mobility among the academic and industry staff and researchers.76 
The parties should thus consider appointing a joint project manager group, comprising 
representatives from all of the PPPP’s institutions, with weekly meetings and a strong back 
line to the analytical staff.77  They might also form a project committee, a committee of 
coordinators, or an alliance committee with representation from all parties, then give that 
body the responsibility for managing the project.  For example, such a committee should 
                                                            
72
 Rai et al, supra note 8, at 25. 
73 See also J. Demotes-Mainard, E. Canet & L. Segard, Public-Private Partnership Models in France and in Europe, 61(4) 
THÉRAPIE, 325 (June-August 2006); Ismail Kola & John Landis, Can the Pharmaceutical Industry Reduce Attrition Rates?, 3 
NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 711-715 (2004);  A. Nissim, Y. Gofur, S. Vesselier, G. Adams & Y. Chernajovsky, Methods 
for Targeting Biologicals to Specific Disease Sites, 10 TRENDS MOLECULAR MED. 269 (2004); Mark Fishman & Jeffery 
Porter, A New Grammar for Drug Discovery, 437 NATURE, 491-493 (2005). 
74 Berg & Kamminga, supra note 70, at 63; R. BADEN HELLARD, PROJECT PARTNERING: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE (1995);  
JOHN BENNETT & SARAH JAYES, TRUSTING THE TEAM: THE BEST PRACTICE GUIDE TO PARTNERING IN CONSTRUCTION  (1995); 
J.J. Myers, Alliance Contracting: A Potpourri of Proven Techniques for Successful Contracting, 18 ICLR 56, 58 (2001). 
75 Demotes-Mainard, Canet & Segard, supra note 73. Demotes-Mainard, Canet & Segard describe two PPP models: the 
simultaneous PPP and the sequential PPP and several other PPP situations, in which the partnership consists of services or 
expertise and in which the public sector acts as an infrastructure providing equipment, competences or research material for 





discuss and decide the substantive criteria for common goals, incentives, and 
responsibilities.78 
C. The Critical Importance of an Appropriate Intellectual Property Regime 
 
The sharing of intellectual property is a crucial contractual element in a PPPP.79  Overly 
broad licenses from academic institutions to private firms can stifle academic discovery and 
squelch innovation. For example, “reach-back licenses,” which give the private firm licensee 
the right to any follow-on innovations developed by the academic institution, are particularly 
burdensome. Similarly, if the academic institution has no access to the discoveries the private 
firm makes when developing and commercializing the technology that can hamper further 
work by the academic researchers. These are not only hotly contested contractual issues but 
also matters of social and governmental import. Accordingly, “Policy-makers must . . . 
determine, through the patent system, how to balance the promotion of downstream 
pharmacogenomics [and other pharmaceutical] research while protecting the rights of 
innovators.”80 We return to this topic in Part VI. 
 
III. Shifting the Parties Away from an Inefficient Prisoners’ Dilemma Nash Equilibrium 
to the Pareto Optimal Frontier 
 
Game theory, which “demonstrate[s] how strategic interactions can lead to inefficient 
results,”81 explains why the parties to a PPPP cannot maximize joint positive utility unless 
they both (1) enter into a legally binding contract that explicitly supports the alliance 
elements instead of just a gentleman’s agreement and (2) respect relational norms. To be 
effective, the PPPP must ensure that the parties act as agreed and have access to symmetrical 
information, that is, that they both cooperate and coordinate their actions.82 In short, the goal 
is to ensure that the parties do not return to their former traditional ways of doing business.83 
A properly framed binding contract, coupled with respect for positive social norms, can move 
the parties away from an inefficient prisoners’ dilemma Nash equilibrium84 to the Pareto 
                                                            
78 Van den Berg & Kamminga, supra note 70; R. SCOTT, PARTNERING IN EUROPE: INCENTIVE-BASED ALLIANCING FOR 
PROJECTS (2001); B. Colledge, Obligation of Good Faith in Partnering of UK Construction Contracts, 17 ICLR 175 (2000); 
D. Jones, Project Alliances, 18 ICLR 411 (2001); Alan Crane & Richard Saxon, The Future, in PARTNERING AND 
COLLABORATIVE WORKING 55-56 (D. Jones, D. Savage & R. Westgate eds., 2003). 
79 See, e.g., Suzanne Majewski & Dean V. Williamson, Incomplete Contracting and the Structure of R&D Joint Venture 
Contracts, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 201 (Gary D. Libecap ed. 2004) (stressing importance of 
allocating property rights in R&D ventures ex ante by contract). 
80 ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 302 (1989). 
81 Ian Ayers, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L.  REV. 1291, 1315 (1990).  As Thomas Shelling explained, “There are 
non-zero-sum games that permeate the economy that have settled into, or have been forced into, inefficient equilibria.”). 
THOMAS S. SHELLING, STRATEGIES OF COMMITMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 151 (2006). 
82 Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 
218 (2009) (“[C]ooperation failures are not the only obstacles individuals face in achieving their ends. Game theory 
identifies another pervasive problem: the need to coordinate.”). Because the participants’ goal is to coordinate their behavior, 
“Each player’s choice of strategy thus depends on the choice made by her counterparts.”  Robert Ahdieh, Beyond 
Individualism in Law and Economics, 91 B.U. L. REV. 43, 63 (2011). Ahdieh further explains: “Because of this 
interdependence, there are ‘multiple equilibria’ in coordination games: more than one set of choices from which neither 
party will deviate, absent a change in strategy by their counterpart as well. As a result, the solution to coordination games—
and hence the determination and prediction of relevant social outcomes—does not lie in any single individual alone.” Id. 
Instead, the players’ “strategies are interdependent, such that each one’s choice depends on the other’s.” Id. at 64. 
83 As Berg and Kamminga stated in regard to contracting a strategic alliance, the contract “effectively supports the alliance 
form and prevents parties from reverting to their former uncooperative and adverse behavior when conflicts arise.” Berg & 
Kamminga, supra note 70, at 59.  
84 As Ayers explains, “A set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to deviate from her strategy 
given that the other players do not deviate.” Ayers, supra note 81, at 1297.  Although all dominate strategy equilibria are 
also Nash equilibria, the converse is not true. Id. at 1297 n. 36. 
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Optimal Frontier, “the locus of achievable joint evaluations from which no joint gains are 
possible.”85 
As Ian Ayers noted, “While the defining aspect of cooperative games is the ability to 
make binding commitments, the leading game-theoretic models of bargaining and contracting 
are non-cooperative. In these models, the binding, externally-enforced nature of contracts are 
‘black boxed’ as binding payoffs for struck bargains.”86 In this Part and in Part VI we look 
inside that “black box” in the context of PPPPs. 
 
A. Avoiding the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
 
The prisoners’ dilemma game,87 which involves two people who have been arrested while in 
possession of stolen goods, demonstrates why two individuals will choose not to cooperate to 
their mutual advantage when they cannot ensure that the other party will not seek a better 
deal by defecting. The game assumes that a prosecutor has only enough evidence to convict 
the prisoners for possession of stolen goods unless one or both of them confess to burglary. 
The penalty for possession of stolen goods is substantially less than the sentence for burglary. 
The two prisoners are placed in isolation and therefore cannot talk to each other. The 
prosecutor visits each prisoner and offers each the same deal. If a prisoner confesses and 
testifies against the other prisoner, he will go free, while the other will receive the maximum 
sentence of four years. If both prisoners confess, they will each get two years in prison for 
burglary. If neither confesses, each prisoner will get half a year in prison for possession of 
stolen goods.  As seen in Table 2, “confession” is the dominant strategy88 because it is the 
optimal choice for each player regardless of what the other player does. Thus, the game ends 
with both players spending two years in prison instead of only half a year, demonstrating that 
decisions that are rational from an individual’s view are not rational when compared with the 
results attainable if both parties can communicate with each other and reach a binding 
agreement. 
 
Table 2: The Prisoners’ Dilemma 
Keep quiet Confess
Keep quiet - ½, - ½ -4, 0 
Confess 0, - 4 - 2, - 2 
                                                            
85 HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 139 (1982). An outcome is deemed Pareto optimal if it is 
impossible to make any party better off without making at least one other party worse off. Id. 
86 Ian Ayers, Symposium – Just Winners and Losers: The Application of Game Theory to Corporate Law and Practice: 
Three Approaches to Modeling Corporate Games: Some Observations, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 419, 422 (1991).  Ayers quotes 
Eric Rasmusen for the proposition that “[c]ooperative game theory may be useful for ethical decisions, but its attractive 
features are inappropriate for most economic situations, and the spirit of the axiomatic approach is very different from the 
utility maximization of current economic theory.” Id. at 423. But Ayers goes on to acknowledge, “As an empirical matter, it 
is possible that the equity axioms of the cooperative solution concepts correspond more directly to reality.” Id. This 
prediction is borne out by research by behavioral economists who combine economics with psychology to test how test 
subjects actually respond to various scenarios. See, e.g., GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW 
HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 1 (2009) (“To understand how 
economics work and how we can manage them and prosper, we must pay attention to the thought patterns that animate 
people’s ideas and feelings, their animal spirits.”); Ahdieh, supra note 82, at 44 (“Experimental studies by both economists 
and psychologists have revealed systematic deviations from rationality across a wide array of settings.”).  
87  See ANATOL RAPPAPORT & ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONERS’ DILEMMA (1965); David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John 
Roberts, & Robert Wilson, Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 
(1982).  Game theory also shows that “many markets are inefficient because of strategic behavior or information 
asymmetry.” RASMUSEN, supra note 80, at 196 (1989).  
88 “[A] set of strategies constitutes a dominant strategy equilibrium if each player’s strategy is a best response to any 
strategies of other players.” Ayers, supra note 81, at 1297 n.36. 
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The aim of the PPPP contract is to move the parties from the negative payoffs of  
(-2, -2) and to avoid the dangerous (0, -4) and (-4, 0) situation by making it possible for both 
partners to achieve positive utility. This requires both cooperation and coordination. 
Changing the payoffs and making the incentives to cooperate more valuable while also 
making deviations from cooperation more expensive will promote cooperation.89  Parties can 
increase the levels of both cooperation and coordination by looking at the future and 
envisioning repeat games.  Repeat games facilitate knowledge transfer between the inventor 
team and the licensee, thereby reducing coordination costs,90 which can result not just from 
misaligned incentives91 but also from the inability “to synchronize joint efforts, either 
because of inadequate mutual knowledge or difficulty in creating such knowledge.”92   
 In a pure-coordination game, the players’ interests are convergent; in contrast, in a 
pure-conflict game, the interests are divergent. 93 Both are games of strategy because “each 
player’s best choice of action depends on the action he expects the other to take, which he 
knows, depends, in turn, on the other’s expectations of his own.”94 
 PPPPs are what Thomas Shelling calls mixed-motive or bargaining games because 
they involve both mutual dependence and conflict.95 For example, the academic researchers 
and private firms need each other to take an invention from the bench to the bedside, but the 
private firm may prefer to be the exclusive owner of all the intellectual property while the 
academics may prefer to put at least some of it in the public domain. 
As discussed further in Part III(B), coordination requires trust, cooperation, and 
negotiation of an appropriate binding agreement with a focus on the agreed-upon common 
goals as well as on the efficient sharing of monitoring, control and property rights, coupled 
with positive incentive mechanisms. By creating a game changing legally binding contract 
and respecting relational norms, the parties can solve the inefficiency in the game and 
generate joint positive payoffs of the sort depicted in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: The Efficient PPPP 
 























Accept and Abide 
by Contract and 
Abide by 5, 5 
                                                            
89 Ongoing relationships such as joint ventures and long term PPPs can be seen as a precursor to more intimate cooperation 
compared with short and finite activities. Long-term relationships can by themselves overcome the dilemma and achieve the 
optimum outcomes. See Ronald W. McQuaid, The Theory of Partnership, in  PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE  28–29 (Stephen Osborne ed., 2007). 
90 Kotha, George, & Srikanth, supra note 37. 
91 Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, The Firm as an Incentive System, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 972 (1994). 
92 Kotha, George & Srikanth, supra note 37, at 498, citing scholars from the knowledge-based view of the firm, including 
Robert M. Grant, Toward a Knowledge-based Theory of the Firm, 17 STRAT. MGMT. J. 109 (1996); Steven Postrel, 
Multitasking Teams with Variable Complementarity: Challenges for Capability Management, 34 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 273 
(2009). 






but Abide by 
Relational Norms 2, 2 
Accept Contract 
but Deviate from 
Relational Norms 3, 3 
Reject Contract 
and Deviate from 
Relational Norms -2, -2 
Breach Contract  -2, 4 4, -2 
 
If both parties agree to a well-drafted binding contract and abide by relational norms, 
then they both have a positive utility of say 5. (These payoffs are arbitrary numbers whose 
importance is their relative value and sign.) If they cannot agree on a contract but abide by 
relational norms then the joint utility (2,2,) would still be positive, that is, greater than it 
would be if there was no cooperation at all but lower than what would result from a binding 
contract supplemented by relational governance (5,5). The same is true if there is a contract 
but relational norms are violated (3,3). Given the critical importance of allocating intellectual 
property rights by contract, we are assuming that the joint utility is less in this situation, 
though that may not always be the case. If, however, a party breaches the contract then, 
unless the other party waives its contract rights, this opportunistic behavior results in a loss to 
the nonbreaching party (say, -2), which may be compensable at least in part by damages, and 
ill-gotten gain by the breaching party (say, 4). 
As discussed in Part VI(C), a trusted intermediary can ensure that neither party seeks 
to gain advantage at the expense of the other. In this way, it is like a defense attorney hired by 
two prisoners who is bound in advance to pass along only plea bargains offered by the 
prosecutor that treat both prisoners the same.96 
 
B. Relational Governance as a Complement to not Substitute for a Binding Contract 
 
As explained in the literature on incomplete contracting,97 it is impossible, without incurring 
virtually unlimited transaction and monitoring costs, to devise a long-form contract that 
covers every contingency. However, contrary to the assertion that an enforceable long-term 
contract is inherently antithetical to trust building and other relational norms and instead 
encourages opportunistic behavior,98 a study of outsourcing arrangements between U.S. and 
Indian firms found that “clearly articulated contractual terms, remedies and processes of 
dispute resolution” can complement trust-building behavior, such as bilateralism, flexibility, 
                                                            
96Ayers, supra note 85, at 423-24 (“By pre-committing through joint counsel to ignorance, the prisoners can thus mitigate 
their incentives to fink on each other.”). 
97 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 69;  Liza Vertinsky, Universities as Guardians of their Inventions, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1949, 
1979  (2012) (“Contracts governing investment of effort and transfer of tacit knowledge will inevitably be incomplete and 
difficult to enforce as a result of asymmetric information and hidden effort levels.”).  
98 See, e.g., Charles W. L. Hill, Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: Implications for Transaction Cost 
Theory, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 500 (1990). 
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and repeated exchanges.99  
Similarly, a study of German contracts for the purchase of software in Asia and 
Eastern Europe found that German companies use formal contracts “as a communication 
document,” which is especially important when there are “no common sociocultural norms 
that could implicitly govern the exchange beyond the contract itself.”100 As one German 
expert put it, “[O]ne still needs a contract as the basis of cooperation so that everyone knows 
what one talks about and what is expected.”101 Even if a German company elects not to sue 
for breach of contract because the verdict could not be enforced in court, German companies 
use private enforcement mechanisms to ensure contractual performance, including (1) 
checking the reliability of potential business partners, (2) dividing transactions into milestone 
phases with an option to abandon if a milestone is not met, (3) monitoring and controlling the 
actions of their foreign contracting party by, for example, securing the right to access directly 
that party’s internal project management systems, and (4) relying on “overarching 
reputational networks, which consist of companies, foreign trade chambers, and trade 
associations.”102 These techniques are also available to the participants in a PPPP. As Thomas 
Dietz explained, by performing real-time monitoring and employing milestones, which are 
both forms of relational contracting, “the involved actors turn the transaction from a simple 
prisoner’s dilemma into a repeated game . . . .”103  
Legally astute managers work with counsel as partners to create shared value by 
remaining actively involved in the negotiation process and using it as a way to get to know 
the counterparties better, to clarify expectations and objectives, and thereby strengthen 
relationships.104 As Steve Huhm, the vice president of strategic outsourcing for HP Services, 
remarked: “Negotiating these kinds of deals requires being honest, open, and credible. 
Integrity is critical to our credibility.”105 In short, “[T]he goal is to create value by crafting a 
workable deal, not to position the company for a lawsuit.”106 
Asymmetric information can lead to inefficient contracting even in the absence of 
transaction costs.107 Open books and sharing of all transaction-relevant information pursuant 
to binding agreements reduce “moral hazard” and “adverse selection” and, from that, reduce 
the risk of “hold-up” and “defection.”  Thus, symmetric information is a requirement for 
aligning incentives and obtaining joint optimization.108 The greater the volume of information 
exchanged, the larger the possibility of optimizing the joint utility.  
For example, the in-house staff at Pfizer works side-by-side with leading academics in 
basic and translational science in Pfizer’s Centers for Therapeutic Innovation.109 The 
researchers have access to Pfizer “compound libraries, proprietary screening methods, and 
                                                            
99 Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or 
Complements?, 23 STRAT. MGMT. J. 707 (2002).  
100 Thomas Dietz, Contract Law, Relational Contracts, and Reputational Networks in International Trade: An Empirical 




104 Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 378 (2008).  
105 Quoted in HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON WINNING NEGOTIATIONS 108 (2011). See also 
Darin Bifani, Win the Battle or Build a Relationship: How Japanese Style Could Help American Negotiators, 12 BUS. L. 
TODAY 25, 28 (2003). 
106 CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY, WINNING LEGALLY: HOW TO USE THE LAW TO CREATE VALUE, MARSHAL RESOURCES, AND 
MANAGE RISK 93 (2005).  
107 Ian Ayers, The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 387 (1991). 
108 See also Steven Shavell, Contracts, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 433 (1998). 
109 See Pfizer, supra note 61. 
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antibody development technologies that are directly relevant to the investigators’ work.”110 
Academic principal investigators (PIs), postdocs, and Pfizer scientists  work jointly on 
research projects within the Centers for Therapeutic Innovation laboratory and also in the 
academic laboratories.  This facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge and enables the 
inventor team and the licensee to better synchronize their commercialization efforts. 
Furthermore, by establishing a compensation mechanism that rewards cooperation and joint 
optimization, a well-drafted PPPP contract creates the opportunity for changing the parties’ 
behavior in various scenarios. 
This approach is consistent with the “proactive law movement,” which began in 
Scandinavia and then was officially embraced by the European Economic and Social 
Committee in 2009.111 In the case of contracts: 
A proactive contract is crafted for the parties, especially for the people in charge of its 
implementation in the field, not for a judge who is supposed to decide about the  
parties’ failures. Instead of providing the most advantageous solution for one of the 
parties, in case of the failure of the other party to comply with its contractual 
obligations, the proactive contracting process and documents seek to align and 
express the interests of both sides of the contract in order to create value for both.112 
Studies point to the win-win aspect of pharmaceutical public-private partnerships to 
develop low-cost drugs for developing countries, which often result from the public sector’s 
need for medicine with the potential for only a small or even negative return on investment 
for the pharmaceutical company. For example, Nwaka analysed the development of malaria 
drugs in developing countries pursuant to Medicines for Malaria Venture’s partnerships.113  
In the Medicines for Malaria Venture Win-Win Proposition-partnerships, the parties must 
commit to a long-term relationship and share the risks and rights under a common 
understanding with joint goals. Nwaka found a positive correlation between the distribution 
of intellectual property rights and the degree of targets achieved.  Because the Malaria 
Venture partnerships involve the public’s demand for expensive medicine—not private 
industry’s demand for marketable drugs— Nwaka’s results cannot be attributed directly to 
the types of PPPPs analyzed in this article.  Nonetheless, they illustrate existing alternative 
contractual models within the pharmaceutical industry based on the idea of cooperation and 
accordingly offer insights for other types of PPPPs.114 Additional insights can be gleaned 
from the experience in the United States and the EU with public-private partnerships in the 
infrastructure space. 
 
IV. Lessons from Public-Private Partnerships in the Construction Industry 
 
The construction industry has used long-term partnering contracts as a strategic tool to 
maximize the utilization of public and private core competencies and other resources and to 
diversify risk.115 A traditional arm’s-length contract in the construction industry would be 
                                                            
110 Id. 
111 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, “The Proactive Law Approach: A Further Step toward Better 
Regulation at European Union Level,” O.J. C175, vol. 52, July 28, 2009 (EU). See also GEORGE SIEDEL & HELENA HAAPIO, 
PROACTIVE LAW FOR MANAGERS: A HIDDEN SOURCE OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 11-12 (2011). 
112 Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Robert C. Bird & Helena Haapio, Promoting Business Success through Contract Visualization, 
17 J.L. BUS. & ETHICS 55, 61 (2011). 
113 Solomon Nwaka, Drug Discovery and Beyond: The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in Improving Access to New 
Malaria Medicines, 99 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF TROPICAL MEDICINE AND HYGIENE 20, 25 (2005). 
114 See also B. Stirner, Stimulating Research and Development of Pharmaceutical Products for Neglected Diseases, 15 EUR. 
J. HEALTH L. 391 (2008). 
115 Christina D. Tvarnø, Law and Regulatory Aspects of Public-Private Partnerships: Contracts Law and Public 
Procurement Law, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 216 (Graeme A. Hodge, Carsten Greve 
& Anthony E. Boardman eds., 2010). 
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based on optimising each party’s own utility by defining the performance expectations in 
terms of quality and quantity, breach, warranties, liability and dispute solutions. In contrast, 
partnering contract paradigms in the construction industry include clauses incorporating trust, 
cooperation, symmetrical information, positive incentives, and successive negotiation.116  As 
a result, construction public-private partnerships are in many respects analogous to PPPPs. 
In the United States, the concept of infrastructure partnering dates back to the 1960s 
when the U.S. government developed a method of stimulating private investments in 
infrastructures.117  The goal was to protect the public interest while at the same time bringing 
investment potential and added value from the private sector.118  The economic recessions in 
the 1970s led other governments to seek more efficient ways to provide services and 
infrastructure by “contracting out.”  Great Britain and the United States were particularly 
strong proponents of privatization in the 1980s.119 The use of public asset sales, outsourcing, 
and divestitures of state-owned enterprises became a vehicle for improved public service in a 
free market economy.120 
In Great Britain, some of the first attempts to establish a new type of contract 
stemmed from problems related to poor quality construction, high costs, and the lack of 
competition.  In 1998, Sir John Egan presented the report, Rethinking Construction,121 which 
focused particularly on “lean” production and cooperation, and resulted in the development 
of the partnering concept.122  Based on the results of the Egan report, the construction 
industry adopted a new contract model using collaboration, negotiation and common utility – 
“the partnering contract.”  Rethinking Construction asserted that “[e]ffective partnering does 
not rest on contracts. Contractors can add significantly to the cost of a project and often add 
no value for the client. If the relationship between a constructor and an employer is soundly 
based and the parties recognize their mutual interdependence, then formal contract documents 
should gradually become obsolete.”123 For the reasons provided in Part III(A) we respectfully 
disagree and view formal contracts and trust-building as complements not substitutes.  
The first model partnering contract was created in 2000.124 It included clauses 
incorporating trust, cooperation, information, positive incentives, and successive 
negotiation.125  The objective of a partnering contract is to reduce cost and price; to increase 
quality; to reduce risk and failure; to improve coordination; and to share responsibility and 
capacity.  By using a well-crafted partnering contract, the parties can achieve additional value 
compared with other approaches, as long as there is an effective implementation structure and  
the objectives of all parties can be met within the strategic alliance.  
                                                            
116 Id. See also Neil Alderman & Chris Ivory, Partnering in Major Contracts: Paradox and Metaphor, 25(4) INT’L  J. PROJ. 
MGMT. 386 (2007);  Christina D. Tvarnø, Why the EU Public Procurement Law Should Contain Rules that Allow 
Negotiation for Public Private Partnerships: Innovation Calls for Negotiating Opportunities, in EU PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, 
MODERNISATION, GROWTH AND INNOVATION: DISCUSSIONS ON THE 2011 PROPOSALS FOR PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES, JURIST- 
OG ØKONOMFORBUNDET  201-219 (Grith Skovgaard Ølykke, Carina Risvig Hansen & Christina D. Tvarnø eds., 2012).  
117 See also R. Scott Fosler, Book Reviews, in Public-Private Partnership: New Opportunities for Meeting Social Needs, 
46(4) PUB. ADMIN. REV. 364 (Brooks et al. eds., 1986); Nutavoot Pongsiri, Regulation and Public Private Partnerships, 
15(6) INT’L J. PUB. SECTOR MGMT. 487 (2002). 
118 Andersen, Cao, Tvarno & Wang, supra note 70, at 25 n. 30. 
119 Pongsiri, supra note 117. 
120  DONALD F. KETTL, SHARING POWER, PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND PRIVATE MARKETS (1993).  
121  SIR JOHN EGAN, RETHINKING CONSTRUCTION (1998). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 PCC 2000, ACA Standard Form of Contract for Project Partnering (2008). 
125 Id. See also Neil Alderman & Chris Ivory, Partnering in Major Contracts: Paradox and Metaphor, 25(4) INT’L  J. PROJ. 
MGMT. 386 (2007);  Christina D. Tvarnø, Why the EU Public Procurement Law Should Contain Rules that Allow 
Negotiation for Public Private Partnerships: Innovation Calls for Negotiating Opportunities, in EU PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, 
MODERNISATION, GROWTH AND INNOVATION: DISCUSSIONS ON THE 2011 PROPOSALS FOR PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVES, JURIST- 
OG ØKONOMFORBUNDET  201-219 (Grith Skovgaard Ølykke, Carina Risvig Hansen & Christina D. Tvarnø eds., 2012).  
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The utilization of the partnering contract concept led to the creation of public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) for the construction of public buildings and infrastructure.126  The 
governmental attention to the efficiency of market mechanisms and the success of 
privatization efforts in several countries led to increased governmental interest in PPPs.127 
Over time, governments found a way to better serve their citizens by tapping the private 
finance markets to fund higher quality construction while reducing taxes.128 At the same time, 
private companies discovered new markets and developed new ways to compete and meet 
consumer demand. 
In a traditional PPP infrastructure project, the legal relationship has a relatively long 
duration because the financing partner focuses on regaining the private investment.  Often, it 
is the public sector’s need for financing that drives the decision to pursue a PPP.  But as an 
added benefit, the private sector’s key competencies (e.g., designing, managing, and building 
the project) are usually more efficient than the public sector’s.129  Further, this type of 
arrangement incorporates an alternative model of risk sharing whereby risks that would 
otherwise be borne solely by the public sector can be transferred to the private party, to the 
extent that this is efficient with regard to the specific project.130 Research on infrastructure 
PPPs has emphasized both that (1) the public party must give up some degree of control and 
accept that the private party must be able to realize an attractive yield on its investment and 
(2) the private party must possess sufficient expertise to reduce the total cost over time.  
In the case of pharmaceutical public-private partnerships, the pharmaceutical 
enterprise needs the public-funded research and the skills of the academic scientists, due to its 
own lack of path-breaking in-house innovation and investment in basic science, especially 
across disciplines. Private firms also need the intellectual property regime and contract 
enforcement mechanisms provided by government. In turn, the pharmaceutical firm bears the 
significant legal and financial risks associated with developing, approving, and marketing 
new products. 
From a societal perspective, it makes sense to share resources efficiently between 
both the resource holder and the resource demander, but the private pharmaceutical enterprise 
must cede some control to the public party and accept that the public party stands in a 
superior negotiating position because the public party has resources (funding, research, and 
the ability to confer legal rights) the private party needs.  Thus, the private pharmaceutical 
enterprise must identify the positive gains with respect to both the private and the public 
agenda and accept a contract favorable to the public party to obtain joint positive utility. In 
the next Part, we discuss the steps the EU has taken to develop a form of for-profit PPPP 
based on open innovation. 
 
V. The EU Innovative Medicines Initiative and other Policy Developments 
 
A. Innovative Medicines Initiative 
 
                                                            
126 In the late 1990s, national governments could no longer regard themselves as having a purely domestic role in an 
increasingly internationalized world. Instead, they were forced to act more like market players. Richard Common, The East 
Asia Region: Do Public-Private Partnerships Make Sense?, in  PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS,  supra note 100, at 135. 
127 Pongsiri, supra note 117. 
128 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (Graeme A. Hodge, Carsten Greve & Anthony E. 
Boardman eds., 2010). 
129 The economic (private) operator plays an important role, participating in all the different stages of the project (design, 
completion, implementation, funding). The public partner concentrates primarily on defining the objectives to be attained in 
terms of public interest, quality of services provided, and pricing policy. It also takes responsibility for monitoring 
compliance with these objectives. 
130 The European Commission notes that a PPP does not necessarily require the private partner to assume all the risks, or 
even the major share of the risks, linked to the project. The precise distribution of risk is determined case by case, according 
to the respective abilities of the parties concerned to assess, control and bear this risk. 
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In the EU, the Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI) is a pharmaceutical public-private 
partnership initiative that differs in substantial respects from the PPPPs that are the focus of 
this article. The IMI is designed to provide socio-economic benefits to European citizens by 
(1) improving drug development and thereby generating faster access to better medicines and 
(2) enhancing Europe’s competitiveness globally by increasing investments in the European 
pharmaceutical R&D industry and thereby establishing Europe as the most attractive place 
for pharmaceutical R&D.131 The IMI research projects are focused on non-competitive 
research in areas of high medical need -- based on the principle of open innovation.  
The public party is the European Union, represented by the European Commission;  
the private party is the pharmaceutical industry, represented by the European Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) and its members.  The European Union 
committed to contribute € 1 billion to the IMI research programme, which is matched by 
private in-kind contributions.132 The public funding is directed primarily to academic and 
non-profit institutions. As of May 2013, forty projects were in operation with a budget of € 
1.2 billion.133  
Each IMI call for a project proposal involves multiple stakeholders, including the 
pharmaceutical industrial trade association; large, small and medium-sized private 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology enterprises; universities; hospitals; patient organisations; 
and public authorities. In particular, IMI contracts involve public funding in response to IMI 
calls for proposals in open competition that is subject to EU regulation. 
In contrast, the Pfizer Centers for Therapeutic Innovation, and other comparable 
PPPPs in the United States, involve a single private pharmaceutical firm that solicits 
proposals from academic researchers for research to be funded by the private firm. The 
private firm forms an assessment committee that evaluates the proposals to find suitable 
projects with the goal of developing the firm’s business without the involvement or 
intervention of competitors or the pharmaceutical industry in general. Thus, IMI contracts are 
different from the PPPPs that are the focus of this article. 
Nonetheless, the tools explained in this article, including using legal clauses and 
relational governance techniques to promote joint utility, could also be relevant in IMI calls. 
Such clauses could be added to the existing IMI Grant Agreement,134 or parties might add 
language to the project agreement to the effect that “the internal organisation of the 
consortium” shall be in accordance with the IMI Grant Agreement. 
 
B. Action Plan Against the Rising Threats from Antimicrobial Resistance 
 
In response to the European Commission’s Action Plan Against the Rising Threats from 
Antimicrobial Resistance, which was launched in November 2011, AstraZeneca and 
GlaxoSmithKline announced that they would jointly contribute a total of € 224 million to 
                                                            
131 IMI regulation (EU) No. 1024/2012 entered into force on 4 December 2012. The IMI Model Framework Service Contract 
(Framework Contract Number IMI.2013.FWC.029) contains no corresponding provisions on joint optimization between the 
parties as discussed in this article. Available at: 
http://www.imi.europa.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/Procurement/IMI.2013.FWC_.029_EventOrganisation_Mod
el-Framework-Service-Contract_2013-04-16.pdf. 
132 Section 14 of the IMI Joint Undertaking Model Grant Agreement Annex II– General Conditions defines “in-kind” as 
“contributions to the project by EFPIA [European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations] companies and 
their affiliated entities, with resources such as personnel, equipment, consumables, declared in accordance with Articles II.4, 
II.13 and II.14.” (On file with the authors.) The private in-kind contribution is worth at least another € 1 billion and comes 
from the member companies of the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA). See the 
IMI Highlights, May 2013, at 
http://www.imi.europa.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/IMI_Highlights_May2013_final.pdf. 
133 IMI Highlights, May 2013, available at  
http://www.imi.europa.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/IMI_Highlights_May2013_final.pdf. 
134 IMI Joint Undertaking Model, Grant Agreement, “Core,” article 1, subsection 4. (On file with the authors.) 
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develop new antibiotics.135 Both firms agreed to share information and to contribute 
compounds to the venture. Thus, this is a private joint venture involving two direct 
competitors designed to meet the public demand for new antibiotics. As such, it offers a 
possible model for the horizontal pooling of private resources.136 
 
C. Patent Package and Inventions Contrary to “Ordre Public” or Morality 
 
The EU Member States and the European Parliament agreed in 2012 on a patent package 
comprising two Regulations and an international Agreement, laying the groundwork for 
unitary patent protection in the EU.137 The patent package implements enhanced cooperation 
among the Member States. All Member States except Italy and Spain have agreed to create 
legislative-based unitary patent protection in the EU by adopting two EU Regulations and an 
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, which will have exclusive and specialized jurisdiction 
over patent cases to ensure uniform protection.138 Once these Member States ratify the 
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, it will be possible to obtain a European patent based on 
unitary standards in one step. This is expected to reduce the costs of obtaining a patent from 
approximately € 23,000 to € 700.  
 Article 53(a)  of the European Patent Convention provides that patents shall not be 
granted for “inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to ‘ordre 
public’ or morality; such exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it 
is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States . . . .” The Directive 
on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions precludes patents on processes for 
cloning human beings, using human embryos for commercial or industrial purposes, 
“processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings,” and “processes for 
modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering without 
any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such 
processes.”139 Depending on how these provisions are interpreted, they could affect the 
ability of pharmaceutical firms in the EU to patent certain genetic inventions 
                                                            
135 Public-Private Partnerships Step Up, APPLIED CLINICAL TRIALS ONLINE (June 4, 2012). 
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Court. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-
49). 
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Inventions of July 6, 1998, O.J. EC (L 213/13). For a discussion of the impact of this Directive on stem cell research, see 
Clara Sattler de Sousa e Brito, Case Note, Biopatenting:“Angst” v. European Harmonization - The ECJ Decision on Stem 




D. Other Initiatives 
Other recent legislative-based initiatives have led to improved marketing authorization 
procedures, the harmonization of data protection in the EU, better access to medicines for 
children, and a new regulatory framework for advanced therapies.140  Thus, the focus at the 
law and policy level is generally on competition, legislation and public funding, but not on 
the important tool of using game theory to optimize collaboration through contracts and 
relational governance. As argued above, a PPPP is a form of strategic alliance that can flip 
the incentives and ensure joint utility and the optimal transaction by improving the gains from 
the partnership and ensuring greater economic efficiency. In the next Part, we explain the 
intellectual property infrastructure necessary to convert the “dead capital”141 created by the 
universities into commercially viable products. 
 
VI. Intellectual Property Issues Inherent in Academic-Industry Collaborations 
 
As noted earlier, the sharing of intellectual property is a crucial contractual element in a 
PPPP.142  Although this article does not purport to enumerate all of the intellectual property 
issues present in a PPPP, certain issues warrant discussion, including ownership of 
inventions, licensing and patent considerations, the role of university technology transfer 
offices, public policy concerns raised by university licensing, and technology transfer in the 
EU. 
 
A. The Bayh-Dole Act 
In the United States, R&D by a university is frequently the first step in the development of a 
new drug.  The federal government funds the bulk of academic research in the United 
States,143 thereby raising questions as to who actually owns the invention – the government, 
the contractor-university, the inventor, or the private entity that “commercializes” the 
invention.144   
Prior to the enactment in 1980 of the Bayh-Dole Act,145 neither scientists nor 
universities could patent inventions funded with federal government research money.146 
“Under the ‘commons’ model, the federal government sponsored basic research and 
encourage its widespread publication in the public domain without regard for potential 
commercial applications.”147 As a result, the results of research funded with government 
grants became part of the public domain or were subject to only nonexclusive licenses.148  
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hypothecated). 
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The purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act was to facilitate the commercialization of 
government-funded research by establishing a uniform set of rules for the ownership of 
federally funded inventions with a presumption “that universities own inventions that are 
developed under their watch.”149  (Similarly, the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation 
Act150 gave federal research laboratories the right to transfer technology developed in the 
government lab to a nongovernment entity, such as a private university or a for-profit 
firm.151) To promote commercialization, especially of inventions that require substantial 
further research and development and testing to get a product to market,152 Bayh-Dole 
requires universities to seek to commercialize federally funded research through patents and 
licensing or to give the exclusive rights to the invention back to the government.153 Although 
the government has a “march-in” right to circumvent a patent when a product is “potentially 
lifesaving,” it has rarely, if ever, been used.154 In addition, federally funded researchers are 
required to grant the federal government a nonexclusive license to use federally funded 
inventions.155 In exchange for patenting government-funded inventions, both public and 
private universities in the United States can charge licensing fees and royalties.156 Once the 
patent expires, the invention becomes part of the public domain. 
 
 
B. University Technology Transfer Offices 
 
Because “only about 50 percent of all patented inventions (including those arising from 
university research) ultimately achieve commercialization,”157 the process by which a 
university transfers discoveries to the private sector for commercialization (“university 
technology transfers”) is a priority for academics, industry, and governments.  Research 
laboratories can transfer academic discoveries and inventions to the private sector for 
commercialization both informally through scientific publications and presentations and 
formally through research contracts, consulting engagements, licenses, and patent 
agreements.158  
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Universities typically license their discoveries to private firms for 
commercialization.159 As one scholar explained: 
 
Once universities secure legal ownership rights to inventions, including those 
that are federally funded, entities ranging from startups to mature companies 
license those inventions.  Subsequently, the companies may provide additional 
funding for collaborative research where IP rights are allocated between the 
universities and private collaborators according to contractual agreements. 
The terms of in-and out-licensing agreements are governed by private 
contracts and invariably contain complex arrangements.160  
 
To deal with the complex issues involved in patenting and licensing  inventions, many 
research universities in the United States have established technology transfer offices 
(“TTOs”) or technology licensing offices (“TLOs”) that function as “central clearinghouses 
for university generated inventions.”161  These offices, which tend to deal with the more 
“formal” transfer of technology, ensure compliance with Bayh-Dole “by collecting invention 
disclosures, coordinating patent prosecution, and negotiating licenses with firms.”162  The 
parties to a PPPP should take into consideration the role and function of the university’s TTO 
when drafting the PPPP agreement to avoid the inefficiency of a traditional licensing game.  
As an example, the Pfizer’s Centers for Therapeutic Innovation PPPPs are governed 
by an agreement that provides that all joint inventions will be jointly owned, with Pfizer 
holding an exclusive option to license a drug after proof of mechanism.  In the event Pfizer 
exercises its option, any jointly developed enabling intellectual property (IP) will be licensed 
from the institution. If Pfizer declines, the IP and other joint assets revert to the academic 
institution.163 
 
C. Public Policy Concerns Raised by University Licensing 
 
Public policy questions are raised when a university patents an invention then licenses it to a 
private entity.164  Although most universities have dedicated themselves “to the creation and 
dissemination of knowledge for the public good,” 165 the leadership of each university must 
“decide whether and to what extent to embrace commercially oriented activities” based upon 
the respective university’s “mission.” 166   
Certain universities “view technology transfer as indelibly linked with their social 
obligations as universities.”167  Because “[u]niversities . . .  are not in the business of 
developing commercial technologies,” some argue that the private sector is better suited to 
commercializing academic inventions.168 Thus, “the link that connects publicly sponsored 
research and private-sector commercialization is technology transfer.”169    
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Yet, unduly close ties between academic researchers and industry can create conflicts 
of interest170 and force a shift from basic to applied research.  In addition to interfering with 
the creation and transfer of knowledge, licenses to private firms can deprive patients of life-
saving drugs. As a result, “strong resentment and frustration have emerged as a result of the 
licensing and patent policies of universities,” particularly when universities grant exclusive 
licenses to firms that restrict access to essential products in the developing world.171 
Specifically, many licenses entitle the pharmaceutical enterprises to “determine the countries 
where they intend to file subsequent patents”; for-profit companies “generally file strategic 
patents in many developing countries to minimize the risk of competition from generic 
drugs.”172  
In response to pressure from a coalition built by Yale Law School student Amy 
Kapczynski in 2000 and 2001, which included the inventor of the HIV drug Zerit®, the Dean 
of Yale’s School of Public Health, the former head of the WHO’s HIV/AIDS program, and 
600 Yale professors, researchers and students who signed a petition calling on Yale to “‘ease 
its patent’” on Zerit®, Yale University persuaded its exclusive licensee Bristol-Myers Squibb 
to enter into an “agreement not to sue” with Aspen Pharmaceutical, the leading generic 
manufacturer in South Africa; as a result, Aspen was able sell the drug in South Africa at a 
fraction of the price charged in developed countries.173 
Thus, certain universities “have recognized the impact they can have on improving 
access to medicines that originate on their campuses” and view themselves as “ideally suited 
to address the dire needs of the estimated 10 million people who die each year because they 
do not have access to existing medicines and vaccines.” 174  For this reason, they may be 
willing to forego some or all license and royalty fee revenue, especially when the invention 
relates to a disease prevalent in developing countries, such as malaria and tuberculosis. 
To address concerns about access to life-saving drugs, a group of universities 
promulgated a statement of “Nine Points to Consider” when patenting or licensing 
pharmaceutical inventions.175  That guidance explains that universities should structure 
licensing agreements in a manner that gives “underprivileged populations,” especially in 
developing countries, no-cost or low-cost access to pharmaceutical innovations.176  
Alternatively, a university may try to license its invention only to a pharmaceutical enterprise 
with similar humanitarian views, under a concept termed “socially responsible licensing.”177  
Or, a university or private firm may seek an NGO, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation,178 to pay a fair royalty or licensing fee for drugs for patients in developing 
countries and neglected diseases. 
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Other universities have sought to maximize the royalty streams available from their 
research. Particularly at a time when available federal grants from the NIH and other funders 
have been sharply reduced, royalty income may be seen as necessary to continue to fund 
further research or other needs, including financial aid for needy students. 
Further policy issues arise when a university issues an exclusive license on a 
foundational technology or research tool to a private for-profit pharmaceutical enterprise. For 
example, Harvard University came under criticism after it granted in 1990 exclusive rights to 
the DuPont Pharmaceutical Company to the “oncomouse,” a strain of transgenic mice created 
with “a proprietary gene-insertion method called Cre-loxP, which enables a researcher to 
select particular conditions under which expression of a transgene may be induced or 
repressed.”179 DuPont demanded that scientists (1) stop sharing data generated by research 
using the mice, (2) submit future scientific journal articles to DuPont for pre-publication 
review, and (3) give DuPont “‘reach-through’ rights to downstream inventions arising from 
the use of transgenic animals created by the Cre-loxP method.”180 The director of the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) and others pressured DuPont to relax its restrictions on 
the use of its transgenic animals and to stop demanding reach-through rights.181  
The NIH subsequently adopted protocols offering guidance for when it is appropriate 
for a research university to patent certain innovations.182 Although it lacks clear legal 
authority to do so, the NIH has conditioned grants on an applicant’s willingness to forego 
seeking broad patents on the human genome. 
Certain academics counter that exclusive patent licenses reduce “the perceived risk of 
investing in unproven technology to attract private risk capital.”183 But former Harvard 
President Derek Bok states, “Zealous campus officials can slow commercial applications and 
drive up prices of valuable products by granting exclusive patent licenses, where 
nonexclusive licenses would be feasible, merely to let the university share in any monopoly 
profits that the exclusive licensee manages to earn.”184 
One solution is to instead create patent pools, which grant a license to all participants 
and all comers on a non-discriminatory, nonexclusive basis at a commercially reasonable 
royalty rate.185  Such an arrangement can also help mitigate competition law concerns as long 
as it is open to all public institutions and private firms.186   
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For example, the Innovative Medicines Initiative, Europe’s largest public-private 
pharmaceutical development partnership, pools 500,000 chemical compounds, of which 
300,000 came from Astra Zeneca, Bayer Pharma, Merck, Sanoh, and the other member 
companies with the balance coming from academia and smaller firms. Similarly, the 
Predictive Safety Testing Consortium (PSTC), managed by Critical Path, a trusted nonprofit  
intermediary created by the FDA and the major pharmaceutical firms, facilitates multi-firm 
collaboration on methods to predict and test drug safety.187 Critical Path “collects 
membership fees from pharmaceutical firm participants, coordinates the selection of research 
projects, and (with the assistance of an advisory committee composed of Critical Path and 
pharmaceutical firm representatives) manages the flow of any confidential information. If the 
PSTC advisory committee deems it appropriate to seek patents on technology generated by 
the consortium, Critical Path will own the patent rights.”188 The objective of PSTC is “‘broad 
public dissemination of the research and development projects’” undertaken by the 
Consortium; accordingly, “Critical Path is obligated to license any patents it may own to all 
comers on commercially reasonable terms.”189 
Patent pools can be problematic on antitrust grounds to the extent that they unduly 
restrict “innovation markets.”190 As Arti Rai and her coauthors have noted, “In practice, the 
overriding focus in most cases is . . . whether the collaboration is likely to accelerate or slow 
the pace at which R&D efforts are pursued. The agencies specifically recognize that 
‘[t]hrough the combination of complementary assets, technology, or know-how, and R&D 
collaboration may enable participants more quickly or more efficiently to research and 
develop new or improved goods . . . .’”191 Given the uncertainty even under the more lenient 
U.S. law, we agree with Professor Rai and her colleagues that any horizontal collaboration 
should be first vetted by the relevant antitrust/competition law authorities. 
 
D. Proposed Amendments to Bayh-Dole 
 
Scholars in the United States have encouraged Congress to amend Bayh-Dole to address 
concerns that it has stunted innovation by creating an “anticommons,”192 which occurs when 
“property rights cannot be aggregated efficiently to create, for example, effective methods for 
assembling and screening new molecules or to realize the ambitions of personalized 
medicine, which would require whole-genome sequencing.”193  This is of particular concern 
as it affects the public availability of research tools and upstream research related to emerging 
areas, such as pharmacogenomics, the study of genetic traits that “might underlie variation 
among individuals in drug response, based on individual differences in enzyme structure and 
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function.”194  As Heller and Eisenberg explain, “Each upstream patent allows its owner to set 
up another tollbooth on the road to product development, adding to the cost and slowing the 
pace of . . . innovation.”195 Certain empirical studies suggest that patents have not been as 
much of an impediment to upstream academic research as originally theorized, but that 
appears to be due in large part to the fact that “scientists typically ignore patents, and that for 
the most part, they get away with it.”196 For example, respondents in a study of German large 
pharmaceutical firms, small-and-medium sized biotechnology firms, biotechnology research 
institutions, and clinical institutions associated with universities doing R&D in genetic 
engineering “indicated that patents on research tools were infringed ‘behind locked 
laboratory doors,’ that patentees were generally unaware of such infringements, and that 
scientists might not be aware of the legal implications of making or using patented research 
tools.” 197 The manufacturers of generic drugs in the United States do not have that option 
because the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (commonly 
referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act)198 requires them to certify to the Food and Drug 
Administration that the generic product does not violate any valid patent.199  
There are currently open innovation public-private collaborations to promote genomic 
research. They include the SNP Consortium, a non-profit foundation established by the 
Wellcome Trust, pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms, and academic research centers 
with the objective of publishing “‘a high-density SNP map of the human genome.’”200 It has 
amassed a database of more than 3.1 million SNPs.201 A SNP, pronounced “snip,” is a single 
nucleotide polymorphism, that is, “a difference in a single DNA building block, called a 
nucleotide.”202  SNPs “are the most common type of genetic variation among people. . . . For 
example, a SNP may replace the nucleotide cytosine (C) with the nucleotide thymine (T) in a 
certain stretch of DNA.”203  As the NIH explained, “SNPs may help predict an individual’s 
response to certain drugs, susceptibility to environmental factors such as toxins, and risk of 
developing particular diseases.”204 
Merck & Co. and Washington University created the Merck Gene Index, “a public 
database of gene sequences corresponding to human genes” designed “to preserve open 
access to knowledge that could aid in drug discovery.”205 Ironically, had this research been 
funded with federal money, putting the invention in the public domain, and thereby 
precluding anyone from patenting it, would not have been an option for Washington 
University unless it wanted title to the inventions to revert to the U.S. government. 
We submit that the current Bayh-Dole regime, which forces a university to patent an 
invention or lose its rights, is ill-suited to the development of biomedical drugs tailored to 
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individual genomes. At least for upstream inventions and research tools, we argue that 
universities should have the option of promptly publishing the invention, thereby precluding 
anyone from obtaining a patent on it.206 IBM and other software and hardware firms have for 
a number of years put certain inventions in the public domain in this fashion. In addition, Red 
Hat and other “open source” software companies207 have created outlets for publishing prior 
art, which helps prevent the erroneous patenting of  existing technology and the creation of 
“patent thickets” that unduly inhibit future discoveries.  
David C. Hoffman articulated a three-prong strategy for dealing with the 
anticommons created by “patent thickets” and “patent stacking” in the biotechnology 
space,208 which we would encourage regulators in both the United States and the EU to 
consider. First, create a broad experimental use exemption for public sector researchers that 
“would cover non-commercial use of any biological material, reagent, or research tool for 
which an equivalent substitute is not readily available biomedical research tools.”209 Second, 
establish a compulsory licensing regime for “essential reagents and research tools” used in 
commercial biotechnology research administered by a collective rights organization (“CRO”) 
comprising representatives of the NIH, the National Science Foundation, the Biotechnology 
Industry Organization, (or, in the case of the EU, the analogous organizations) and public 
academic research  institutions.210 Instead of having Congress (or the Member State or the 
European Parliament) set uniform licensing rates by statute, the CRO would determine the 
licensing fees based on its assessment of “the development costs and commercial potential of 
new methods, reagents, and research tools.”211 As a possible model for broadly applicable 
technologies, Hoffman cites the terms under which Stanford University and the University of 
California licensed the foundational Cohen-Boyer patents on basic recombinant DNA 
technology, the most lucrative inventions ever created in university laboratories.212 These 
universities widely and nonexclusively licensed the technology to public sector researchers, 
required institutional users to pay “a nominal annual fee for a license covering every 
researcher at a particular campus or research facility,” and then assessed reach-through 
royalties (which were modest) only for products that came to market.213 Third, limit the scope 
of biotechnological patents by requiring a more complete “enabling description” of the 
claimed invention in the specification that discloses an “‘inventive concept or principle 
whose precise contours are defined by the claims.’”214 Pursuant to the EC Biotechnology 
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Directive, the European Patent Office already requires DNA patent applications to set forth 
the “industrial applicability of the information revealed.”215 
In addition, we support the recommendation that Congress amend Bayh-Dole to give 
the NIH, instead of the Commerce Department, the power to dictate, as part of the grant 
application process itself, the grantee’s right to patent the funded work and to exclusively 
license it.216 This would not, of course, preclude a private firm from funding a line of 
research with high economic potential, so there would be a market check on the NIH’s 
funding conditions. Thus, to the extent that biotech firms and large pharmaceutical firms 
develop pharmacogenetic test kits and innovations without using government-funded 
research, they would be able to patent those inventions without a duty to grant licenses to 
other private firms. 
Given the devastating effect of budget cuts on NIH funding, it may be appropriate for 
Congress to give the NIH to retain a right to receive a small percent of the royalties generated 
by those inventions that are ultimately commercialized. This is tricky, however, because it is 
important not to distort the grant-approval process to remove funding from the type of 
research the private markets are most unlikely to fund, basic research. Thus, Congress might 
want to limit the percentage of NIH grants eligible for royalty recovery. 
Finally, we argue that universities should be precluded from granting exclusive 
licenses for upstream inventions and research tools funded by the government. This would 
have avoided the Harvard oncomouse situation. If a university patents government-funded 
upstream inventions and research tools, it should be required either to grant nonexclusive 
licenses at a royalty rate not in excess of the private funding used to fund the research that led 
to the invention or to put the invention in a patent pool, managed by a trusted intermediary, 
that is open to all at a commercially reasonable rate. In addition, we support creation of a broad 
experimental use exemption for patented biotechnology research tools.217 
Although we believe that these changes are important to ensure that the United States 
continues to play a leading role in emerging technologies, such as pharmacogenomics, these 
changes would also create an intellectual property licensing regime that would be more 
compatible with the norms and rules in the EU, a subject to which we turn next. 
 
E. University Technology Transfer in the EU 
 
In the EU, there has been to date poor knowledge transfer from the academic science base to 
industry. This is due, among other factors, to an academic culture that might prevent 
commercialization218 and to the lack of harmonized legal rules comparable to the Bayh-Dole 
Act, 219 which creates uncertainty concerning who actually owns intellectual property 
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stemming from government funded research.220  Although there are aspects of Bayh-Dole 
that would give needed structure to the inventions created by public institutions in the EU, we 
believe that wholesale copying of the Bayh-Dole approach in the EU would be a mistake. 
Indeed, there are aspects of the EU licensing regime for biotechnology patents that are 
instructive for U.S. policy makers.  
For example, the EU gives less exclusive patent for biotechnology inventions than the 
United States, thereby avoiding some of the anticommons problems with the U.S. regime.221 
The European Directive on Biotechnology, 222 which all of the Member States had 
implemented by 2006,223 treats DNA patents “as information products, whose eligibility tests 
should turn on the quality and industrial applicability of the information revealed.”224 It also 
requires biotech plant patentees to give plant breeders compulsory licenses.225 Although the 
World Intellectual Property Organization has proposed a Substantive Patent Law Treaty,226 
the European Patent Office cited the uncertain nature of such an effort.227 
 The Economist initially characterized Bayh-Dole as “innovation’s golden goose,”228 
but three years later it questioned the influence it had had on university research.229  Yet, as 
of 2012, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Germany, and Norway were considering or 
had recently passed legislation modeled at least in part on Bayh-Dole.230 Although Union-
wide consensus may be difficult to reach, certain Member States have generated rules to 
facilitate the transfer of technology from the university research lab to the marketplace. 
 For example, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Denmark have national rules that 
embody at least some of the same legal objectives as the Bayh-Dole Act.231 According to the 
UK Patent Act of 1977,232 academic researchers are employees of the university and therefore 
patent rights stemming from their research belong to the university. In Germany, an 
amendment to the German Employed Inventor’s Act provides that a university can claim 
inventions created by its employees on its campus using government funding. Denmark also 
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enacted an amendment to its patent laws233 concerning ownership of property rights to 
inventions made in university settings to encourage the development and commercialization 
of scientific inventions by splitting the revenue from intellectual property contracts between 
the inventing researchers and the institutions.234 In contrast, professors in Sweden own the 
rights to their inventions.235  
Many EU Member States have technology transfer offices to commercialize 
inventions created in government laboratories. Although a number of universities in the EU 
have established technology transfer offices to promote commercialization and licensing 
patents to companies, Denmark and the other Nordic countries prohibit public universities 
from asserting ownership rights to government-funded inventions.236 Results from an OECD 
report237 show that there is a large diversity in the structure and organization of technology 
transfer offices238 within and across the Member States, but the majority appears to be 
dedicated on-site institutions that are integrated into the university or research institution.  
 
F. Another Possible Impediment to PPPPs in the EU: The State Aid Directive 
 
Another possible impediment to creating PPPPs in the EU is the restriction in Article 107(1) 
of the Treaty of the Function of the European Union (“TFEU”)239 on the use of State Aid to 
favor a particular private enterprise. Article 107(1) provides: 
 
Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State 
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens 
to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be 
incompatible with the internal market. 
 
In principle, all public funding to universities is State Aid, so universities in the EU 
must comply with the State Aid rules when they collaborate for economic gain with industry. 
Thus, any public funding that could distort (or just threatens to distort) competition by 
favoring certain enterprises, will be incompatible with the internal market if it affects the 
trade between the Member States.240 That is why universities clearly separate their economic 
and non-economic activities. Articles 107 and 108 of TFEU and EU law in general have no 
uniform rules that can be applied to ensure the correct separation of economic and non-
economic activities for State Aid purposes. Instead, this responsibility rests with the Member 
States.  
Given the goals of the Innovation Union and of Horizon 2020, an exemption to the 
State Aid restrictions should, however, be available for pharmaceutical R&D created by a 
                                                            
233 See also Bekendtgørelse af lov om opfindelser ved offentlige forskningsinstitutioner, LBK nr 210 af 17/03/2009 at 
https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=123680. 
234 Siepmann, supra note 219. 
235 Stevens & Effort, supra note 173, at 98. 
236 Maria “Tess” Barker, Comment, The Use of Universities’ Intellectual Property to Address Humanitarian Concerns in 
Developing Countries, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 923, 938 (2011), citing Niklas Bruun, Innovation 
Policy, Academia and Intellectual Property Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 915 (2007). 
237 OECD, Turning Science into Business: Patenting and Licensing at Public Research Organisations (2003). 
238 Variations include on- or off -campus offices, arm’s length intermediaries, industry sector-based technology transfer 
offices, and regional technology transfer offices. 
239 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 107(3)(b), March 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. 
EU (C 83) 47. 
240 See also Bernhard von Wendland, State Aid and Public Funding for Universities and other Research Organisations, 
COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER 54, 55 (no. 2, 2010) 
33 (8.4.13) 
partnership between a university and a private enterprise pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) and 
107(3)(c) of TFEU,241 which provide: 
 
The following may be considered to be compatible with the internal market: 
… 
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European 
interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; 
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to 
an extent contrary to the common interest . . . . 
 
There is precedent for this in the form of the legislation for government funding of 
orphan drugs, which are drugs designed to treat small subsections of the population. The U.S. 
Congress enacted the Orphan Drug Act (“ODA”) in 1983242 to provide incentives for private 
firms to develop (1) drugs for diseases affecting fewer than 200,000 patients in the United 
States or (2) drugs for diseases affecting a larger population for which “there is no reasonable 
expectation that the cost of developing and making available in the United States a drug for 
such disease or condition will be recovered from sales in the United States of such drugs.”243 
The ODA provides a seven-year period of marketing exclusivity for the drug, even if it would 
not otherwise be eligible for patenting,244 federal funding through the Food and Drug 
Administration,245 and a fifty percent tax credit for human clinical trials.246 The EU adopted 
similar legislation in 2000,247 but it limits the period of exclusivity to four years if the product 
is sufficiently profitable.248 In 2003, the British Nuffield Council on Bioethics recommended 
that regulators “use existing orphan medicine legislation, or any other policy instrument with 
equivalent effect, to provide incentives for development” of pharmacogenomics  
products.249 The same reasoning could be applied to other types of drug development. 
 
VII. Proposed Technology Licensing Regime for the EU 
 
Although there are significant advantages to the U.S. approach to commercializing 
government-funded inventions, we submit that the EU should not enact legislation akin to 
Bayh-Dole without giving universities and public funders more discretion over both when 
technology must be patented to avoid having it revert to the government and when exclusive 
licenses are permissible. We agree with Liza Vertinsky: “Universities should . . . be viewed 
not simply as ‘engines,’ but rather as guardians of their inventions, and the law should be 
designed to encourage their responsible involvement in shaping the post-discovery future of 
their wards.”250  This would create a middle ground between the model of open innovation in 
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the IMI and the anticommons created by the current U.S. system. In addition, we encourage 
policy makers in the EU to consider David C. Hoffman’s three-prong strategy for dealing 
with the anticommons created by “patent thickets” and “patent stacking” in the biotechnology 
space.251 
Both to reduce transaction costs252 and to provide more certainty with respect to the 
EU competition laws and the State Aid Regulation, we propose that regulators in the EU 
create a safe-harbor for PPPPs using pre-approved standardized licensing contracts, such as 
the Uniform Biological Materials Transfer Agreement. Universities are often willing to 
acquire materials in accordance with such agreements but demand more favorable terms 
when asked to transfer their own materials, creating a collective action problem.253 By 
offering a safe harbor for parties willing to accept such an agreement, regulators in the EU 
could help facilitate transfer of materials as well as technologies. 
Because one-size rarely fits all, 254 the standardized contracts “blessed” by the EU 
regulators could provide alternative licensing terms from which the parties to the PPPP could 
select. Like Beirne Roose-Snyder and Megan Doyle, who proposed “a comprehensive 
approach to humanitarian licensing for universities—a Global Health Licensing Program,” 
which includes “a toolbox of access licensing options for technology transfer offices to use 
during licensing negotiations,” we would encourage policy makers in the EU to offer various 
alternative arrangements. One might be a nonexclusive license of the sort offered by Stanford 
University and the University of California when it licensed the Cohen-Boyer recombinant 
DNA patents.255 Another would be patent pools open to all that allow non-participants to 
obtain non-exclusive licenses at a commercially reasonable rate, perhaps as determined by a 
trusted intermediary. At the same time, certain practices, such as mandatory reach-back 
licenses and prohibitions on the publication of adverse test results by academics receiving 
private funding,256 should be prohibited.  Universities and private firms would still be 
permitted to negotiate customized contracts that do not violate these prohibitions but they 
would not have the benefit of ex ante governmental approval. 
 
Conclusion 
A comparative analysis of the U.S. and EU approaches to translational medicine shows that 
there are lessons to be shared. PPPPs can significantly enhance research, development, and 
commercialization in the pharmaceutical sector and other similar industries. The EU can 
apply the experiences from Bayh-Dole and PPPPs in the United States, and the United States 
can emulate the open innovation aspects of the European IMI concept and the tighter 
patenting standards imposed by the European Patent Office.  
Well-crafted pharmaceutical public-private partnerships combine the contractual 
partnership model inspired by the theory on strategic alliances with the joint optimization 
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attainable by applying game theory, including strategies for repeat coordination games.  They 
represent a powerful legal tool, yet to be widely employed in the European pharmaceutical 
industry, that can both enhance competitiveness and improve societal and individual patient 
welfare.  As a result, we argue that policymakers in the EU should encourage utilization of 
PPPPs and facilitate their formation and operation by clarifying the applicability of the State 
Aid limitations and by permitting universities to obtain patents on government-funded 
inventions, perhaps with a royalty-sharing arrangement akin to what Denmark has recently 
enacted. At the same time, the U.S. Congress should consider promoting open innovation for 
certain upstream research and research tools to avoid placing undue burdens on innovation. 
